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Conference Reports

Dialogue for Creating a Global Vision

The Twenty-Fourth Annual Congress of the Society for Intercultural Education, Training and Research (SIETAR) took place from 19 to 24 November 1998 in Tokyo.

The AFB first established working links with SIETAR at the beginning of 1998, and the Twenty-Fourth Annual Congress of SIETAR International, held in Tokyo, offered an opportunity of consolidating and expanding these links.

SIETAR is the largest association in the world in which intercultural theoreticians and practitioners seek to stimulate and support dialogue between theory and practice in transcultural contexts. By their activities, SIETAR members not only promote understanding between people of different ethnic groups and cultures but also increase awareness of, and sensitivity to, intercultural issues in the academic world, in politics, in the economy, and in education.

Like the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), SIETAR has now acquired several regional partner-organizations. One such is SIETAR Japan, which collaborated with SIETAR International in organizing this Twenty-Fourth Annual Congress.

In general terms, the link between SIETAR and peace studies relates to issues of intercultural understanding and mutual perception in theory and practice--notably in culturally determined social conflicts. Its more specific area of operation is that of intercultural, non-violent conflict resolution, which, since the beginning of the 1990s, has come to constitute something of a new research-paradigm in peace and conflict research. The many different experiences provided by practical instances of intercultural learning and transcultural exchange can be turned to good account by peace studies as an empirical basis for research into non-violent, civilian conflict resolution and into effective crisis-prevention in potentially violent ethnic conflicts.

One day before the start of the congress, half-day and full-day `Master Workshops' were offered, in which, for the most part, the intercultural practitioners were familiarized with both tried-and-tested and newly developed methods of intercultural and transcultural work. There were also opportunities for testing these methods in role-plays and simulations. Amongst the themes focused on here were: (1) Managing across Cultures (led by Fons Trompenaars); (2) Integrated Approach to Intercultural Consulting and Training (Michiko Achilles); (3) New Approaches to Self-organizing Community (Naomi Horoiwa); (4) Teaching and Training across Cultures (Janet Bennett/Milton Bennett); (5) Curriculum Design for Intercultural Trainers and Educators (Alvino Fantini); (6) Making Cross-cultural Knowledge-Transfer Effective (Atsushi Funakawa); (7) Conflict Resolution: Co-operative Problem-Solving in Cross-cultural Settings (Masako Hamada/Beth Fisher-Yoshida); (8) Crisis Negotiation across the Cultural Divide (Mitch Hammer).

In addition to these sessions, there were a large number of panel discussions on such themes as: (1) The Missions of Intercultural Studies; (2) Communication along the Information Super-highway; (3) Managing Crisis into the 21st Century: From the Peru Hostage-Situation and beyond; (4) Empowerment.

Between thirty and forty parallel workshops and other meetings, grouped into three time-bands, took place in the afternoons. Taking twenty or so key questions as their starting-point, these dealt with the following topics (amongst many others): Teaching about Diversity; Trends in Macro-history, Global Civilizations and Peace; Global Threats and a Cultural Dialogue; Intercultural Responsiveness of Higher Education Curricula; Proposal for a Comprehensive Conflict-Resolution Model and Options for Conflict-Resolution Education; Asia and Pacific Basin First Peoples; the Intercultural Development Inventory; A Validated Measure of Intercultural Sensitivity; Defining the Intercultural Paradigm; the Cultural Complexity of Ethnic Conflict; Socio-historical Practice: A Critical Approach to Intercultural Communication.

In many of the workshops and meetings that were offered, the intercultural competence of indigenous peoples played a central role. In one half-day round-table session on this theme, many hours were spent in intensive discussion about the indigenous peoples of New Zealand, Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

Another major theme--Women and Empowerment--ran like a thread through a number of work-groups led by women (academics and practitioners) from Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. The focus here was on women's endeavours in intercultural and gender-related social disputes, and on the methods, such as mediation and other non-violent techniques, which they use to resolve conflicts. The last plenary talk, given by the Japanese woman jurist Mizuho Fiukushima, was also notable in this regard; she talked about the changes in the role of women in present-day Japan and gave an impressive account of Japanese women's intercultural competence and the breadth of their ability to deal with conflict in a society characterized by harmony.

The talks and discussions at the conference were complemented by slide-shows and videos on open and closed societies, on indigenous peoples and their intercultural skills, on transcultural exchange, and on the influence of architecture on cultural life-views and life-styles.

The conference was rounded out by an impressive extra-curricular cultural programme. Every evening, participants were given a different glimpse of Japanese culture (including indigenous Japanese, or Ainu, culture) and of other east-Asian life-styles. The modern yet typically Japanese accommodation, in student rooms in the university, was part and parcel of this. It facilitated communication and gave participants a chance to enjoy Japanese comforts such as the communal onsen (hot bath) or evening cups of green tea on the tatami (rice-grass matting)--and, of course, outstanding Japanese cuisine.

SIETAR offers peace studies a very welcome chance to extend its academic and practical horizons, focusing as it does on cultural aspects of conflict, crisis, and war.

Regine Mehl (Bonn) / Rita Wuebbeler (Atlanta)

Contact: SIETAR International, PO Box 467, Putney, VT 05346 USA, Tel.: +1-802-387-4785, Fax: +1-802-5783, e-mail: sietar@sover.net, http://www.sietarinternational.com

New German Foreign and Security Policy

The Twenty-Seventh Colloquium of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (AFK: German Association for Peace and Conflict Research) took place at the Evangelische Akademie in Iserlohn from 26 to 28 February 1999

This year's colloquium focused on German foreign and security policy under the new federal government. The aim was to examine the `foreign policy as peace policy' maxim--as set out in the coalition agreement--with special emphasis on the possible contribution to be made here by peace studies. Framework conditions such as NATO operations without UN mandates, the new NATO strategy, nuclear disarmament, and the reform of the German army were also included in the discussion. The points raised included not only theoretical considerations and requirements in regard to a new German foreign and security policy, but also the likelihood of such requirements being realized.

The opening talk--`Peace Research and German Foreign Policy'--given by Ulrich Albrecht (Free University of Berlin, Chairman of the AFK), made it clear that there was a considerable need for discussion about the new German government's conduct in foreign affairs and security. By way of illustration, Professor Albrecht cited the stance adopted by the government in the vote on the resolution in favour of a nuclear-weapon-free world in the UN General Assembly, and its stance on NATO operations in crisis regions. All in all, Professor Albrecht concluded, the German government needed to promote debate about these issues, not only within its own ranks itself and but within society as a whole.

In his talk on `The Academic Discourse on Foreign and Security Policy in Germany', Gunther Hellmann (Technische Universität Darmstadt) called for the new `Berlin republic' to demonstrate a new self-assurance as compared with what he said could be described as the `yes-man' Bonn republic. An increase in self-confidence, he said, was also being called for by an ever-greater number of German politicians--though this attitude tended to be regarded with mistrust abroad. Dr Hellmann also discussed the future role of Germany on Europe's possible journey to supranational union. Most importantly, he said, academic findings must be incorporated into political practice. There was no doubt that academic research could provide pointers for action and could play a part in shaping foreign and global policy. During the ensuing discussion, the need for UN mandates to justify intervention in crisis regions was questioned on the grounds of possible abuse of the right to veto. This was countered by pointing to the violation of the German constitution and of international law that would result through unmandated action.

Speaking from the standpoint of gender research, Christiane Lemke (University of Hanover) referred to the `stereotypical thinking in foreign policy' and stressed the need for `critical approaches from a gender-based perspective'. Gender research, she said, sought to highlight the fact that central concepts, theories, and issues in foreign policy/politics in general were dominated by masculine attributes such as sovereignty, power, and competition. The findings of gender research aimed to expose the kinds of power-relations that resulted from this and to offer a complementary approach, both in scientific investigation and in politics. This meant, she said, that a new definition of politics and society was needed--one that distanced itself from a system based on bipolarity. Up to now, feminism had been something of a peripheral phenomenon both in peace research and in the political sciences; but it was becoming a more and more important area, because current global problems such as the realization of human rights could not be solved within a framework based on the nation-state principle. Feminism--or gender research--said Professor Lemke, was mainly being realized within non-governmental organizations. She called for findings arrived at from a gender-specific perspective to be `exported' into new approaches for mediation and civilian conflict resolution.

The first day concluded with a celebratory address to mark the sixty-fifth birthday of Klaus Jürgen Gantzel (Professor of Political Sciences at the University of Hamburg). The address was given by Hanne-Margret Birckenbach (Professor of International Relations at the University of Bremen) and was followed by a showing of Peter Watkins's film Cullodon, about the suppression of the Scottish independence rising.

On the second day, there were five parallel work-groups focusing on various aspects of `The New German Foreign and Security Policy'.

Work-Group 1 discussed `Constraints of Globalization and Possibilities of Peace: Theoretical Premises of Strategy-Development and Decision-Making in Foreign and Security Policy'. The main issue here was what bearing the economic, military, and political dimensions of globalization might have on a new German foreign policy. Thomas Jäger (University of Marburg) analysed `German Interests and Options for Action in the World Economy'. He worked on the assumption that the US-Japan-EU triad as a whole was interested in maintaining an open world-economy, but that, at the same time, the EU was competing--chiefly with the USA, but also with Japan--for a say in how the world economy was shaped. Initial comments by the Schröder government led him to conclude that, although the new government wanted to concentrate primarily on internal reforms, it also saw this as a means of improving Germany's international competitiveness and was keen to use the EU as a channel through which actively to exert an influence on the world economy. In the ensuing discussion, Dr Jäger's thesis was taken on board approvingly, but the tussle was seen as taking place not so much between individual macro-regions as between individual types of capitalism or economic strategies. Michael Berndt (University of Kassel) addressed the military aspects of globalization and suggested that, following the deregulation of the economy, military policy was the only foreign-policy instrument which states had left at their disposal. But military policy was no longer used primarily as a means of pursuing concrete objectives; rather, military co-operation in itself--in other words, the formation, or demarcation, of alliances and communities around military co-operation--had become the truly significant element of military policy in the age of globalization. The new German government too was following this line in relying on the reinforcement of the WEU as a strategy for consolidating European co-operative competition with the USA. There was general agreement with this thesis, but in the ensuing discussion, the qualificatory point was made that military policy did also involve concrete minority-interests--on the part of the arms industry. Hartwig Hummel (Technische Universität Braunschweig) asked to what extent German UN policy tallied with the concept of global governance--which, he said, was increasingly portrayed as a way out of the constraints imposed by globalization. Germany, he said, had two special links with global governance. First, the initiative to set up the Commission on Global Governance had come from Willy Brandt, immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Secondly, the EU--and above all Germany, as the most influential country within it--was seen as a model and pioneer in getting global governance established. Despite this, Germany had so far essentially failed to lived up to this role: up to now, German UN policy had been dominated by economic self-interest and the effort to secure a permanent seat in the Security Council. In the coalition agreement, however, there were signs of a clear orientation to the concept of global governance--at least conceptually. That said, the agreement contained a number of conflicting statements, notably in regard to NATO and the German army. In the ensuing debate, the conceptual changes in German foreign policy were welcomed, but at the same time the significance of the coalition agreement was downplayed.

Work-Group 2 debated `The New Direction in Foreign and Security Policy'. Konrad Gilges MP, spokesperson of the SPD left-wingers' Study Group on Peace, commented that a new government could not be expected to have brought about any decisive changes after only 130 days in office. This view was not only rejected by the work-group participants, it was also called into question by Christiane Rix, special adviser with responsibility for political education in Hamburg, in her remarks on the first 100 days of the Red-Green coalition. She said it was clear from the contradictions contained in the coalition agreement, and from the very small number of properly formulated new approaches it proposed, that no radical turn-around in foreign and security-policy was envisaged. Key pointers here were the fact that there had been no change in security-policy guide-lines and no comment on military interventionism or the various European armament projects. At the same time, stress was laid on the need to bring international politics within the ambit of civil society, on conflict prevention, on strengthening the UN and international law, and on promoting peace research. Dieter Reinhardt, spokesperson of the international politics office of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, attempted to tone down this assessment, arguing that the contradictions should be seen against the background of the Realittätsschock--the Greens' sudden encounter with the realities of office. The work-group participants partly rejected this, given that many things had already been put in train under the old government and it was hard to see anything much that was qualitatively new. In connection with the first-use discussion in particular, it was, they said, hard to gauge whether Joschka Fischer (the German foreign minister) was now backtracking or whether work was continuing to be done on this behind closed doors. Wolfgang Gehrke MP, Deputy Chairperson of the parliamentary PDS party, considered that the generous scope for action that had existed (viz. with a strong governmental majority and a weak USA) had already been squandered. Large sections of the discussion were dominated by the German parliament's decision, taken the day before the colloquium, to make preparations for operations by German ground-forces in Kosovo, within the framework of NATO. The participants expressed great frustration at this colossal violation of international law. It ran counter to all the efforts to translate international relations into legal reality and at the same time strengthen the UN--efforts that had been viewed positively in the coalition agreement as well. Overall, Konrad Gilges was of the view that continuity was a necessary feature of politics. Beyond this, he said, the surprising lack of friction between SPD and Greens on the matter of foreign policy would make it possible to introduce new approaches--e.g. on the important issue of the development of the WEU. But a fair assessment would not be possible until after one or two terms of office. During the discussion, regret was expressed that foreign- and security-policy issues were no longer subjects of public debate. This, it was thought, could be traced back to the general paralysis and fatalism that had spread abroad since the bloody conflicts in former Yugoslavia. It was the job of politics to get the discussion on security and peace going again. The tendency of Red-Green politicians to avoid public discussion because of internal conflicts and contradictions was unacceptable. Support for peace initiatives (the land-mine campaign was cited as a successful example of this) and recourse to expertise and evaluation were indispensable if there were to be a serious attempt to take a new direction.

Using the Kosovo troubles as an example, the third work-group analysed the effectiveness of German foreign and security policy as a means of resolving conflict. Jutta Koch (Academic Advisory Service to the German Bundestag) led in with a short historical account of this `age-old' conflict. She highlighted the ever-changing history of Kosovo and the way in which the conflict had grown more acute when Kosovo's autonomous status within former Yugoslavia had been revoked. The conflict had undergone a further stage of escalation when the Albanian liberation-movement, the UCK, had taken up arms in Kosovo. Against this background, Marie-Janine Calic (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen) traced the negotiating process in Rambouillet, in particular the political line adopted by the Contact Group. The difficulties that had caused the continuation of the Rambouillet conference to be postponed until 15 March 1999 were, she said, mainly due, firstly, to the Serbian delegation's unwillingness to negotiate, and, secondly, to the fact that the crucial question of the `demilitarization of Kosovo' (and hence of the UCK) could not be resolved. Christine Schweitzer (Bund für Soziale Verteidigung, Minden) said it was in Germany's interest to--amongst other things--get `Europe's backyard' put into order peacefully and alleviate the refugee-situation. Germany, she said, was not cutting much of an independent figure within the various organizations (Contact Group, OSCE, EU, NATO). Jutta Koch and Christine Schweitzer both expressed the view that the change of government had not brought a change of policy but revealed a preference for continuity. This was rejected, and as a counter-argument it was pointed out, amongst other things, that had it not been for Joschka Fischer, NATO bombs would already have been dropped at the time of the Contact Group meeting in London. In this instance, it was claimed, the German foreign minister had managed not only to get his position accepted in the face of US opposition but also to draw Russia back into the conflict-resolution process. All the members of the work-group were agreed that Germany, in common with other countries, was using the Kosovo conflict as a way of achieving other purposes--e.g. in the debate about the possible restructuring of the German army as an intervention force and in the discussions about a new strategic concept for NATO or a Common Foreign and Security Policy--with special reference to the role of the WEU. In the view of Marie-Janine Calic, NATO's attempt to push ahead with `self-mandating' (i.e. the conduct of operations without a mandate from the UN Security Council) offered particularly clear proof of a `new quality' in German foreign and security policy, and also belied the continuity thesis. She therefore very reasonably asked what scope for action the German Bundestag had left if international law and the basic principles of the German constitution were ignored in preliminary proceedings, and the machinery of the Germany army was already de facto at work in preparation for NATO operations? Christine Schweitzer pointed out that exiled Albanians had had quite well-developed plans for a new Yugoslavian republic since the early 1990s. The purpose of the Kosovars' non-violent resistance had been to bring about an internationalization of the conflict. This hope had now been realized and it was possible to pick up the old plans. Marie-Janine Calic was of the view that we had to break free from the supposedly successful Dayton model, because, for various reasons, it was not transferable to Kosovo. Political and military tasks in Kosovo should not be entrusted to NATO; instead, the possibility of deploying troops from a variety of sources--e.g. within the framework of the OSCE or WEU, with Russia included (possibly via the `Partnership for Peace')--should be considered. The German government should increase its financial and material support for non-governmental organizations and small-scale projects (e.g. as part of the German UNESCO programme or via school-book projects); it should also use its current presidency of the EU to get the EU's approach to regional matters clarified. It should strengthen co-operation with Russia and work to promote a multilateral approach within the framework of the OSCE and/or EU-WEU (perhaps in combination with NATO's `Combined Joint Task Forces'). Another possibility was that German should organize, or take part in, a conference on south-east Europe, where, against a broader background, the Kosovo question could be tied in with other, latent regional conflicts, and some kind of settlement could be worked out.

Work-Group 4 discussed the usefulness to German foreign and security policy of the approaches elaborated by peace and conflict research. Sabine Jaberg (Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg) concluded that, even after the change of government, there were still problems in this area. She traced these back not only to the unfavourable overall political climate, but also to the unsatisfactory framework conditions--e.g. academic reservations about, and also a lack of, concrete approaches. Dr Jaberg believed this `reticence' could be overcome through success at the political level. Apart from identifying this lack of properly elaborated approaches--which, it was said, could be addressed in a concrete way by considering issues such as whether or not there should be NATO operations, and whether or not such operations needed a UN mandate--the discussion focused mainly on the theme of implementability. It was pointed out that the results of academic investigation were often too theoretical to be relevant to practical action. It became clear that there needed to be effective mediation between academic investigation and politics. Martina Fischer (Berghof Research Center, Berlin) said that the mention of peace research made in the coalition-agreement served as an alibi. Now that the government had completed its first one hundred days in office, a little scepticism was in order on this point (note, for example, its acquiescence in the attacks on Iraq and the way it had dealt with the Kosovo crisis). Dr Fischer considered that there was undoubtedly a willingness on the part of politics to consult and co-operate with research, but that the extent of this fell far short of what was needed.. Moreover, co-operation on peace research should move into a broader context--in other words, be co-ordinated with policy on development and human rights. For this to be done, there must be increased co-operation between government ministries, NGOs, and peace-research institutions. That said, the idea of a single concept covering all domains was not really feasible, given that conflict resolution had to be geared to the specific circumstances of the conflict in question. The idea of a civilian peace-service, and thus of the possible institutionalization of this, was also touched upon. But this notion was rejected, because a professional peace-service might be construed by the parties to a conflict as an `imperialist imposition'. Peace research must do more to champion crisis prevention in the political domain. In the classic example of intervention, violence first had to escalate before the international community got involved. Berthold Meyer (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt/M.) focused on the role of compulsory military service. It was, he said, currently undergoing a crisis of legitimation. Since the end of the 1960s, the number of conscientious objectors had risen steadily; at the same time, there had been a disappearance of any immediate external threat. Amongst the things that could still be cited as justifications were the maintenance of rapid availability and the expectations of alliance partners. Roland Kaestner (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) rounded off the discussion with some observations on the commission of inquiry into the future of the German army. He urged above all that there be a public discussion, as opposed to the present plan of having the commission work behind closed doors. The group saw two possible outcomes to the commission's work: everything would carry on as before, with minor changes to the army's tasks; or the Germany army would be integrated into a future European allied force, with concomitant arrangements for civilian conflict prevention. In the ensuing discussion, it was observed that, from the point of view of peace policy, neither of these two possibilities constituted an alternative. Mr Kaestner also called for continual modernization of the German army, in order at all times to guarantee superiority over people such as Milosevic and thus be able to match up to the new requirements of crisis and conflict management.

Work-Group 5 concentrated on the question of whether a critical review of the new government's security policy should be published, and, if so, what form this review should take. The answer to the first part of this question was an unequivocal `yes', whereas the point about the nature of the publication needed lengthier deliberation. The discussion took place against the backdrop of the German ministry of defence's announcement of a commission of inquiry into the structure of the German army. In his introduction, Ulrich Albrecht (Free University of Berlin) outlined the similarities between the start of the 1970s and now: in each case, although there was a new social-democrat-led coalition, more or less everything in military policy was to be left to run along the old lines. However, the historical context had changed considerably, he said: there was no comparable equivalent of the post-1968 phase of social renewal. And the task today was to push the German government along the path laid out in the coalition agreement, not to persuade it to reverse course. Detlef Bald (Freiburg) outlined developments in German security-policy since 1990, highlighting the continuities that were discernible despite the upheavals in world politics. One major feature here, he said, was the emphasis on the national components of security policy. Again, in relation to right-wing extremism in the German army (not just amongst shaven-headed new recruits, but also amongst leading personnel), there were, he said, new developments to discuss. The work-group agreed to take the creation of the commission on army structure as an opportunity to subject the commission's mandate to critical scrutiny, and afterwards to put together a publication setting out the steps that were needed in security policy. If appropriate, a further publication would then be produced, commenting on the commission's report, which was due to appear in two years' time.

On the afternoon of the second day, Peter Schlotter (PRIF) presented the new Friedensgutachten 1998 (1998 Peace Report). This annual publication is jointly produced by the Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik Hamburg (IFSH: Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy), the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), and the Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft (FEST: Protestant Institute for Interdisciplinary Research). This year's edition focused on the themes of the use of force and the eastward expansion of NATO. Dr Schlotter raised the question of public reaction to the report. He noted that there had been a particularly positive response in the trans-regional print-media; by contrast, television and radio had been a bit of a letdown. The report was also available in many bookshops. Almost as if in response to Dr Schlotter's remarks, Helmut Hugler (a member of the parliamentary staff of Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) said that the report was a valuable aid to Bündnis 90/Die Grünen in its work because its relatively short articles made it easily assimilable in motions and discussions.

In the evening there was a meeting of the Netzwerk Friedensforscherinnen (Women Peace-Researchers' Network), to which Ruth Klingebiel (the AFK's representative on women's affairs) invited all the women participants. This was the second annual meeting of the re-established network, and it agreed that an e-mail information and discussion list should be set up. The list will be maintained by Regine Mehl (director of the Peace Research Information Unit Bonn).

The second day ended with a showing of a series of videos entitled `Interferenz, Continuum u.a.' by the video-maker Jan Verbeek (Kunsthochschule für Medien Cologne).

On the last day of the meeting, Klaus Jürgen Gantzel presented the AFK's prize for up-and-coming researchers (the Christiane Rajewsky Prize) to Katharina Burges of the University of Braunschweig for her work into `The New Enemy-Images: A Critique of Rationally Inspired World-Views as an Attempt to Illuminate the Postmodern Age'.

To close the conference, there was a panel discussion on the theme `Peace, Peace Research and Public Attitudes'. Given the stagnating sales-figures for peace-research publications, the question arises as to how the public currently view peace research and how interest in it might be increased. The first problem here is that of finding a way to reach beyond the specialist readership, to the general public. Elvira Claßen (University of Siegen) highlighted two difficulties in this respect: first, in the public's mind, the concept of peace was linked mainly with the peace movement; secondly, to merit media attention, subjects had to demonstrate some degree of newsworthiness and conform to the language of the media; this meant representation in pictures and in an appropriately brief format. Whether the concerns of peace research could be put across in one and half minutes, without any context or background information, was, however, doubtful, said Ms Claßen. She called for journalists to be encouraged to tackle subjects in greater depth, including within the peace movement. Barbara Budrich (from the publisher's Leske + Budrich) pointed to the problem of sales-figures in specialist areas such as peace research. Publications in this latter area were uneconomical and there was not much of a market for them, particularly as there were no established courses of study in this field. The situation would not change as long as this was the case. Ulrich Albrecht pointed out that the public took a greater interest in peace research when there were military conflicts on the agenda. The loss of interest when there were no acute crises had to be offset in a creative and imaginative way, he said. One fact to emerge from the ensuing discussion was that peace, being a process, was a very difficult idea to convey as compared with the clearly defined notion of war. Mention was also made of the new media, which could make the subject accessible to a broader public at a lower cost. In conclusion, it was noted: that peace research and the way it was presented needed to be strengthened, both in content and institutionally; that journalists needed to be appropriately trained in order to be able to put peace research across effectively; that the fight to secure the public's attention is an important one and, if necessary, must be conducted according to the media's own rules--without peace research being allowed to lose its identity.

Carina Fiebich (Münster)

(with the aid of work-group reports by Hartwig Hummel, Christiane Lammers, Elisabeth Wollefs, Carina Fiebich, and Ulrich Albrecht)

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